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RFRA
DAVID P. CURRIE
What a refreshing opinion!
It matters not whether one approves or disapproves of the
strict neutrality standard of religious freedom Justice Scalia laid
down in Employment Division v. Smith.' I have long been sym-
pathetic to the argument that the Free Exercise Clause grants
no special exemptions from generally applicable laws, but I am
troubled by such issues as the confidentiality of confessions, gen-
der discrimination in the priesthood, and sacramental wine. On
the question presented by City of Boerne v. Flores,2 howev-
er-the question of separation of powers, federalism, and the
rule of law raised by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA)--there could be only one answer. There was really not
much to say, and Justice Kennedy said it: Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment empowers Congress to enforce its provisions,
not to revise them.4
Justice O'Connor, who thought Smith was wrong, agreed with
the majority on this point.5
That the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to en-
force but not to revise its provisions is not only what the Consti-
tution plainly says;6 it also reflects the original understanding.
When Congress provided statutory sanctions for violations of the
* Edward H. Levi Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
Many thanks, as always to Barbara Flynn Currie for, inter alia, helpful comments
and encouragement.
1. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
2. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
4. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
5. See id. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justices Souter and Breyer, who
agreed with O'Connor about Smith, did not reach the question of congressional au-
thority. See id. at 2185 (Souter, J., dissenting); id& at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
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amendment, the Court upheld the statute;7 but when Congress
went beyond the amendment to create new limitations of its
own, it was called to order by the Court.'
There are circumstances in which, as the Court acknowledged,
a new limitation or prohibition can qualify as a legitimate means
of enforcing the amendment itself? The Court held that literacy
tests for voters did not per se offend the Fifteenth Amendment
because they did not, on their face, discriminate on grounds of
race.10 But the tests were so often administered in a discrimina-
tory fashion, and discrimination was so difficult to detect and
prove in the individual case, that Congress concluded a prophy-
lactic ban was necessary to prevent evasion of the constitutional
command. The Court correctly upheld this provision as an appro-
priate means of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment."
7. See, e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 349 (1880) (upholding a statute im-
posing criminal penalties for violations of Fourteenth Amendment provisions).
8. The most famous example is the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), which
struck down an effort to prohibit private discrimination. Cf United States v. Reese,
92 U.S. 214 (1876) (striking down a statute interpreted to go beyond the Fifteenth
Amendment by forbidding denial of the right to vote on any ground); United States
v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 559 (1876) (invalidating other attempts to punish pri-
vate action); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 637 (1883) (same). The Court
discussed this line of decisions in Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2166. See also DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS
393-401 (1985) [hereinafter CURRIE, THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS] (discussing the Civil
Rights Cases and other cases in this line of decisions).
Similarly, when Congress and the Court found legislative authority implicit in
the oath requirement of Article VI and the fugitive clauses of Article IV, Section 2,
they concluded only that Congress might implement the constitutional provisions, not
that it might expand them at will. See Act of June 1, 1789, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 23; Act of
Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 562-
63 (1842); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 69 (1860); see also DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1901 13-15
(1997) [hereinafter CURRIE, THE FEDERALIST PERIOD]; Currie, THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS, supra, at 243-44.
9. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2163, 2167.
10. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54
(1959).
11. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 133 (1970). For a particularly dramatic
example of the same reasoning, see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
334-35 (1966) (upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which forbade any change in
the election laws in an area with a history of voting discrimination without prior ap-
proval by the Attorney General or by a federal court).
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As the Court recognized in Flores, there was a similar line of
equally unimpeachable decisions under the essentially identical
enforcement provision of the Eighteenth Amendment.'
The Court found no evidence of a comparable problem in
Flores.3 Congress simply disagreed with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.'4 And thus the
many precedents permitting Congress to forbid practices de-
signed to circumvent constitutional restrictions did not apply. 5
The only memorable aspect of this part of the opinion is that,
as in striking down Congress's insolent attempt to keep guns out
of schools in United States v. Lopez," the Court exercised
meaningful scrutiny in enforcing federalistic limitations on con-
gressional power-as it had seldom done during the preceding
12. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2163 (citing James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265
U.S. 545 (1924)); see also Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926) (upholding a
statute restricting medicinal use of malt liquor, wine, and whiskey); Selzman v.
United States, 268 U.S. 466 (1925) (upholding a statute regulating the sale of dena-
tured alcohol). The Amendment itself forbade the sale of intoxicating liquors only
"for beverage purposes"; Section 2 gave Congress the "power to enforce this articlq
by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933). For further
discussion of this issue, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT THE SECOND CENTURY 180-81 (1990).
There are similar decisions, of course, under the analogous Necessary and Prop-
er Clause See, e.g., Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (affirming
Congress's power to prescribe automatic couplers for cars traveling locally on inter-
state railroads).
13. See 117 S. Ct. at 2169 ("RFRA's legislative record lacks examples of modern
instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry."). Professor
Douglas Laycock, an advocate of the new statute, testified that "deliberate persecu-
tion is not the usual problem in this country." Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 334 (1993), quoted in
Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2169. This is not simply to say that Congress failed to compile
an adequate record; so did the parties before the courts.
14. Smith concluded that the Free Exercise Clause, which the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has been held to make applicable to the states, "does not relieve an individual
of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability."
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). RFRA permitted the govern-
ment to "substantially burden" religious freedom only if it employed "the least re-
strictive means" to further a "compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-
1(b) (1994). Congress's own theory was that RFRA's formulation struck "sensible bal-
ances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests." 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5).
15. See Fores, 117 S. Ct. at 2168-71.
16. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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fifty-eight years. In demanding "a congruence and proportionali-
ty between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end, " 1'7 the Court in Flores set forth an
attractive new test to serve notice that it would no longer blind-
ly accept untenable congressional pretenses that a particular
measure was "appropriate" to enforce the Civil War amend-
ments-or "necessary and proper" to protect interstate or foreign
commerce. Nothing less would be consistent with Marbury v.
Madison."
Thus, the case for RFRA stands and falls with the proposition
that Congress may reverse the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Constitution. But Congress cannot tell the Court what the
Constitution means.
The House of Representatives recognized this nearly 200
years ago in a largely forgotten episode connected with the mys-
terious Western adventures of Aaron Burr. Apprehended follow-
ing the dispersal of his puny band of thugs on the Mississippi
and sent to Richmond for trial, 9 Burr was acquitted by a reluc-
tant jury on the basis of Chief Justice Marshall's narrow reading
of Article IIrs definition of treason. ° Republican zealots
promptly proposed, and the Senate with unseemly haste adopt-
ed, a sweeping redefinition of the offense broad enough to cover
Burr's case.2'
Whether Marshall was right or wrong is neither here nor
there. As even Republican members of the Senate pointed out,
Article III gave Congress power only to punish treason, not to
define it;22 the Constitution itself defined the offense.' It did
17. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164; see id. at 2169-71.
18. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
19. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 181 n.A1 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,
693). For detailed discussions of the Burr episode, see THOMAS P. ABERNETHY, THE
BURR CONSPIRACY (1954); HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERI-
CA DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 219-343, 441-71 (1917);
DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESMENT: SECOND TERM, 1805-1809 215-370
(1970).
20. See sources cited supra note 19.
21. See 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 108-09, 159-60 (1808).
22. See id. at 138 (statement of Sen. Pope).
23. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 ("Treason against the United States, shall consist
only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid
and Comfort.... The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of trea-
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so, moreover, in order to restrain Congress, for in England the
legislative power to define treason had been greatly abused.'
The House rejected the bill without so much as a hearing."
This is not to deny that Congress has the right and duty to
interpret the Constitution. It does so implicitly every time it
passes a bill, for its members too have sworn to respect constitu-
tional limitations on their power.26 Jefferson and Jackson were
right that a president may refuse on constitutional grounds to
enforce or sign a law after the Court has upheld it.' Indeed,
because judgments bind only the parties, Lincoln may even have
been right, within the limits of good faith, that Congress may
reenact a law the Court has struck down.2" But the very basis
of both these positions is that each branch has the obligation to
interpret the Constitution for itself. Congress may adopt an in-
terpretation for its own purposes and for such persuasive force
as it may have for others, as it did in the War Powers Resolu-
tion.29 But Marbury made clear that the Supreme Court must
interpret the Constitution for itself as well.3"
son ... ."); 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 109-11 (1808) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
24. See 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 135-45 (1808) (statement of Sen. Pope) (contrasting
the treason provision with Art. I, § 8, cl. 10, which empowered Congress "to define
and punish," inter alia, offenses against the law of nations).
25. See MALONE, supra note 19, at 368.
26. "Were it otherwise," the Court sagely observed in Fores, "we would not afford
Congress the presumption of validity its enactments now enjoy." City of Boerne v.
Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2171-72 (1997).
27. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 11
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 50-51 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery
Bergh eds., 1905) (explaining Jefferson's pardon of persons convicted under the Sedi-
tion Act); President Andrew Jackson, Veto Message to the Senate (July 10, 1832), in
2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576-91 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896)
(explaining Jackson's veto of the national bank).
28. See President Abraham Lincoln, Sixth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas (Oct.
13, 1858), in 3 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 255 (Roy P. Basler ed.,
1953).
29. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1973). Compare the Second Congress's effort to define by
statute what Article II, Section 1 meant in allotting to each state as many presiden-
tial electors as "the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the
State may be entitled in the Congress." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, c. 2. See Act of
Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239, amended by Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 50, 2 Stat. 295; see
CURRIE, THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, supra note 8, at 138-39.
30. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
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The Court appeared to forget this once in its history, and it
was that slip that gave supporters of RFRA their only real hope
of success. The case was Katzenbach v. Morgan,"1 and the con-
clusion was that Congress could forbid English literacy tests for
voters who had gone to school for six years in Puerto Rico,
whether or not the tests offended the Equal Protection
Clause." One of the reasons was deference to Congress:
[I]t is enough that we perceive a basis upon which Congress
might predicate a judgment that the application of New
York's English literacy requirement to deny the right to vote
to a person with a sixth grade education in Puerto Rican
schools ... constituted an invidious discrimination in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause."3
The Court in Flores distinguished this passage on the ground
that it suggested only that Congress had "a factual basis" for
concluding that New York had violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, not that the Court was required to accept
Congress's interpretation of the amendment itself.' But it is
the courts' responsibility to apply the Constitution as well as to
construe it, and Justice Harlan seems right that the language
quoted is difficult to reconcile with the duty of the Supreme
Court to determine for itself what the Constitution requires.35
Happily, deference to congressional findings was only an alter-
native basis for the Morgan decision. The Court also concluded,
more conventionally, that the restriction of English literacy tests
was an appropriate means of ensuring the nondiscriminatory
treatment of Puerto Ricans that the amendment itself clearly
required. 6
Thus the Flores decision renders a major service to the cause of
constitutionalism by eradicating a nagging doubt created by the
Morgan opinion as to the power of Congress effectively to modify
31. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
32. See id. at 648-49, 656-58.
33. Id. at 656.
34. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2168 (1997).
35. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 665-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
36. See id. at 652; Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2168.
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the Constitution under the guise of enforcing it. For in this re-
spect RFRA unfortunately does not stand alone. Like the Senate
with regard to treason in 1807,"' Congress in recent years has
increasingly succumbed to the temptation to respond to perceived
defects in the Constitution, or in the Court's understanding of it,
by enacting simple legislation requiring neither a two-thirds
majority nor ratification by three-fourths of the states.
When Congress detected a flaw in Article rs unmistakable
requirement that a president approve a bill in its entirety or not
at all,38 it attempted to undermine the provision by allowing
the president to "cancel" particular spending provisions after
signing the law.39 When Congress feared that other states
might be required to recognize Hawaii judgments upholding
marriages between persons of the same gender, it provided to
the contrary by statute4 --undeterred by the fact that the Su-
preme Court had consistently held that the term "full faith and
credit,"4 which appears in the text of Article IV, itself required
respect for judicial decisions.42 When Congress took issue with
the Supreme Court's holding that the judicial power of the Unit-
ed States as defined by Article III did not extend to suits against
states brought by their own citizens,4" it enacted a statute that
said it did.44
37. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
38. "[I]f he approves he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it .... " U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 7.
39. See Line Item Veto Act of 1996, 2 U.S.CA. §§ 691-691f (West 1997); Raines v.
Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997) (dismissing a well-founded challenge to this Act for
want of standing).
40. See Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 2 U.S.C.A. § 1738c (West Supp. 1997).
41. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
42. See, e.g., Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (1 Cranch) 481 (1813). The question of the
validity of this provision is complicated by the uncertain relationship between Article
IV's requirement that states give "full faith and credit" to one another's judgments
and its authorization of Congress to "prescribe" their "effect." See U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 1. But it is by no means certain that the latter provision permits Congress to
excuse what the former requires. See David P. Currie, Full Faith & Credit to Mar-
riages, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 7, 7-8 (1997).
43. See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
44. See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (1994). The
Supreme Court rightly invalidated this provision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116
U.S. 1114 (1996). See David P. Currie, Ex parte Young after Seminole Tribe, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 547-48 (1997); cf United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 128
6431998] RFRA
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
These examples could be multiplied. In some of these cases
Congress may simply have been doing what Lincoln, with much
force, argued it had a right to do: challenge the Supreme Court
to reexamine its own questionable decisions.45 Sometimes, how-
ever, it is difficult to interpret such behavior otherwise than as
an effort to amend the Constitution without respecting the safe-
guards laid down in Article V.
If human nature tells us it is too much to expect that the
Flores decision will put a stop to such nonsense, at least it
seems fair to assume that Flores may indicate to Congress the
futility of attempting to tell the Supreme Court how to interpret
the Constitution.
After the Court in Oregon v. Mitchell" invalidated a congres-
sional effort to lower the voting age to eighteen in state elec-
tions, its decision was promptly reversed in the manner provided
by the Constitution. "The right of citizens of the United States
who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote," says the
Twenty-sixth Amendment, "shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of age."47 "Praise
for the amendment," as I have said elsewhere, "is entirely con-
sistent with applause for the decision; it is the business of the
country, not of the Court, to rewrite the Constitution."48
Flores is a salutary reminder that it is not the business of
Congress either, except in accordance with the exacting provi-
sions of Article V.
(1872) (setting aside a statutory attempt to redefine the constitutional effect of a
pardon).
45. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
46. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
48. CURRIE, supra note 12, at 563.
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